LETTER

TO

HER R——L H——S

THE

P—s D—w—g—r of W—

On the APPROACHING

PEACE.

With a few Words concerning the

Right Honourable the EARL of B—,

AND THE

General Talk of the WORLD.

The THIRD EDITION.

'Tis a Busy talking World, and with licentious breath
Blows as freely on the PALACE *as the* COTTAGE;
Hence have the Talkers of this pop'lous City
A shameful Tale to tell, for public Sport. ROWE.

'Tis the privilege of Britons to reprove their Superiors,
ADDISON.

——— I will Talk,
Tho' Hell itself should from the Center gape,
And bid me hold my Tongue. SHAKESPEAR.

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A

LETTER

TO HER

ROYAL HIGHNESS

The PRINCESS DOWAGER, *&c.*

MADAM,

WHENEVER I consider the nature of the British constitution, or whenever I examine into the real welfare of my country, I cannot avoid reflecting in how great a degree a good Prince must advance the security of the first, and promote the happiness of the latter.

From this conſideration, I am naturally led, not only to a review of the paſt, but into a ſtricture of the preſent, and induced to take a comparative view of preceding æras, to form a juſt eſtimation of the ſtate of my own.

Whatever retroſpect I have made upon former ages, Madam, has been however conſiderably favourable to this. The hiſtory of former reigns is chequred with a variety of circumſtances, that reflect no very great honour upon the adminiſtration of the Prince, or the ſtability of the people; the public diſtruſt that influenced the conduct of the one, and the perpetual jealouſy that actuated the behaviour of the other, could not, in the end, be leſs than prejudicial to the intereſt of both. The apprehenſion of the government naturally leſſened the confidence of the ſubject, and the temerity

rity of the ſubject as naturally leſſened the prerogative of the King. In juſtice, indeed, to the memory of his late moſt excellent Majeſty, it muſt be obſerved, that few princes ever lived more generally admired, or died more ſincerely lamented. Yet amiable as he was in private life, and reſpected as he might be in public, his reign was not altogether free from diſquiets, nor was his government always attended with that domeſtic felicity, which he ſo aſſiduouſly laboured to deſerve.— The conduct of an unpopular miniſter was, for a long time, productive of much national altercation, and the neceſſity may yet poſſibly dwell upon your Royal Highneſs's memory, which his late Majeſty was under of removing him from all his employments, to ſilence the complaints of the people.

As political obſervations are, howeever, but a barren field of entertainment for the ladies, I ſhall endeavour,

to the utmoſt of my power, to avoid blending this epiſtle with thoſe uſual remarks which form the cuſtomary ſtring of modern politics, and confine myſelf principally to ſuch matters, as may naturally occur to a lady's own reaſon, either in times of peace or war, without either loading her memory, or perplexing her imagination.

It is, Madam, a principle immemorially eſtabliſhed, that a perfect unanimity between prince and ſubject, is the beſt foundation for the happineſs of both; and, indeed, where the greatneſs of the prince muſt proceed from the opulence of the ſubject, it is a little ſurpriſing, that this doctrine has not been univerſally embraced. To the ſcandal of government, and the diſgrace of humanity, the hiſtory of EUROPE abounds with many inſtances, where a falſe principle of glory, a rage for a ſcandalous applauſe, has been

been the only guide of the monarch, and ſo a reputation, which the meaneſt of his ſubjects ſhould bluſh to think of, was acquired, no matter what became of the proſperity of the people—Hence wars were begun without cauſe——Deſtruction let looſe without reaſon——Public diſcontent was the neceſſary effect, and the conſequence of that diſcontent, public misfortunes and calamity.——FRANCE has not yet forgot her illuſtrious deſtroyer, LEWIS XIV. nor will SWEDEN, for ſome ages, recover the wounds which ſhe received from the unaccountable phrenzy of her celebrated MADMAN.

To preſerve, or, more properly ſpeaking, to arrive at this ſalutary unanimity, a Prince ſhould be particularly careful in the choice of his miniſters, and place the reins of government in no hands, that had not remarkably laboured for the ſervice of their country.——The man who

who can be an apoſtate to his country, can never be faithful to his King; and 'tis an axiom confirmed by long experience, that the man, who has once betrayed the intereſt of the people, will never ſtick at any meaſures to attain the advancement of his own.——A weak or corrupt adminiſtration is frequently reduced to exigencies, from being diſagreeable to the public; and even ſuppoſing a bad miniſter had really the welfare of his Sovereign at heart, yet he is often obliged to endanger it, from the want of that neceſſary ſupport which can only proceed from the people. This ſometimes expoſes him to the commencement of a raſh war, or the concluſion of a ſhameful and diſhonourable Peace—to an unneceſſary diſburſement of vaſt ſums, and the wanton effuſion of much blood.

Of all the calamities, to which, in the common courſe of things, a nation

tion is expoſed, a war is univerſally allowed to be the moſt affecting. For neighbouring kingdoms, whom humanity and benevolence ſhould connect in one common cauſe, and who ſhould become mutual examples of honeſty and juſtice, to be perpetually employed in ſpilling each other's blood, and deſtroying each other's habitations, is a circumſtance afflictive to the laſt degree, in any boſom not totally diveſted of the faculty to feel; abſtracted from the political conſideration, that the greateſt ſucceſs in any war, is nothing more than a negative advantage, and only reducing our neighbours to a worſe ſituation than ourſelves.

The exigencies of ſtates muſt, however, be a melancholy excuſe for the neceſſity of war; and for the honour of Great Britain be it remembered, that nothing but the moſt preſſing neceſſity has induced her to draw the

ſword,

ſword, or ſcourge the perfidious inſolence of her enemies.

There is a wide diſparity between the private ſufferings of ſubjects and the public injury of ſtates.——The one may overlook an offence without danger; but the ſmalleſt palliation in the other, is an attack in the niceſt part of the body politic, and ſtriking at the very vitals of the conſtitution.

It is not in this place to be obſerved to your Royal Highneſs, how juſt a foundation we had for the preſent war. —That is a truth with which all the powers of *Europe* are perfectly acquainted.—The buſineſs of this letter is only to enforce a proper conſideration to the approaching treaty of peace, and to point the neceſſity of obtaining ſuch terms, as may effectually put it out of the power of our enemies to give us any diſturbance for the future.

As

As it may poſſibly ſeem a little odd, that your Royal Highneſs is troubled with any addreſs of this nature, I muſt urge for excuſe, the tender regard you have always ſhewn for theſe kingdoms, and the many obligations they owe to your Royal Highneſs's diſtinguiſhed excellence and virtue.——To you, under heaven, they are next indebted for the ſecurity of their rights and liberties; and to your Royal Highneſs they owe the firſt advantages, which render them happy as a people.——Providence has been pleaſed to bleſs your Royal Highneſs with an illuſtrious offspring, and to make the ſource of your private felicity the public means of happineſs to this nation.——But, tho' theſe are bleſſings of the firſt importance, we are not leſs indebted to the exemplary care, which your Royal Highneſs has ſhewn in forming the riſing guardians of our freedom to the niceſt ſenſibility of pa-

triotiſm and virtue; to a generous regard for the dignity of the crown, and a glorious ſolicitude for the welfare of the people.

Whenever I reflect upon this delightful ſubject, Madam, and conſider how you have taught,

" *The opening genius of our Royal Youth,*
" *And form'd their footſteps to the paths of truth;*
" *Gave each expanding boſom how to beat,*
" *With all the princes and the patriots*
" *heat;*
" *And nobly raiſed an emulative fire,*
" *To beam with all the glories of its ſire.*"

I am naturally led to think your Royal Highneſs a more proper object of the public addreſs, who have laid it under the higheſt obligation.

Suffer

Suffer me therefore, Madam, in behalf of that public, who think of your Royal Highneſs with the juſteſt admiration, to offer a few plain and rational hints upon the proſpect of an approaching Peace, entirely free from thoſe political perplexities, which generally bewilder the imagination of the reader.

I have already obſerved to your Royal Highneſs, the little neceſſity there is of entering into the motives of the preſent war, which have already been publiſhed to the whole world, and which ſufficiently juſtify the effects of our reſentment; I ſhall therefore decline ſpeaking upon that head, and, agreeable to my firſt declaration, principally confine myſelf to the ſteps which ſhould be taken in conſequence of our ſucceſs.

And firſt, we are to conſider our ſituation as a maritime power, and our intereſt

as a commercial nation.—In either light we have every reaſon to think ourſelves the moſt conſiderable ſtate in Europe, and in conſequence of ſuch a thought, to keep an eye upon our *Importance*, while we hold an attention to our *welfare*. The *reputation* of kingdoms may be juſtly reckoned a matter of the greateſt weight in the ſcale of government, and 'tis a ſelf-evident truth, that the ſecurity of nations is encreaſed in proportion as they maintain their reſpect.

This makes their reſentment dreaded, their alliance courted, and they become naturally more formidable abroad, as they ſet a juſt conſideration upon their importance at home.

Of this truth, the annals of Great Britain bear a ſufficient teſtimony. To what a ſtate of poverty and contempt did the miniſtry of CHARLES the ſecond

cond reduce us, by a ſcandalous inattention to the dignity of the crown, and an infamous neglect of the welfare of the people. Our trade was deſtroyed, our colonies torn from our poſſeſſion with impunity, and our ſubjects butchered without revenge. The Dutch engroſſed all the ſettlements at Amboyna. Their admiral rode up to our very doors, with all the inſolence of triumph, and nearly extinguiſhed every ſpark of that fire, which in Britiſh boſoms might lay a world in aſhes.

Sunk in a licentious ſtupefaction we were ſcarcely able to make any effort for our remaining rights, or the defence of our expiring freedom. Our citizens were effeminate, our nobility riotous, and our monarch diſſolute. The firſt were impoveriſhed, the ſecond were corrupt, and ſcandal to the boaſt of nations, the third was a mercenary dependant upon the bounty, I ſhould have

have ſaid, a voluntary ſlave to the caprice of an illuſtrious ruffian *, at once a diſgrace to a throne, and a ſcandal to humanity.

Great a horror as every boſom muſt entertain for the MURDERER of a KING, yet the very time of the USURPATION was an æra more *nationally* honourable than the interval of ſo weak or corrupt an adminiſtration. For tho' CROMWELL overturned the conſtitution of his country, yet he maintained her *conſequence*; and though he trampled upon her liberties at home, he made her univerſally reſpected abroad. Whereas in CHARLES's time we were a ſcoff to our neighbours, and a reproach to ourſelves. We were plunged in the worſt of ſlaveries, the ſlavery of the ſoul; and ſunk in an indolence and libertiniſm ſo ſcandalouſly inglorious, that nothing but a miracle could poſſibly redeem us.

The

* Lewis XIV. of France.

The effects of CHARLES's adminiſtration, notwithſtanding a ſucceſſion that does honour to the name of royalty, are not yet totally removed, and it required all the virtues of a BRUNSWIC Family to wake in us that regard which we now entertain for our liberty as BRITONS, and our characters as MEN.

From this curſory retroſpect upon a former adminiſtration, it is evident, that the ſecurity of any kingdom muſt conſiderably depend upon that national kind of pride, which preſerves it from making improper conceſſions to foreign ſtates. Abſtracted from theſe prudential cautions, which ſhould be obſerved in all treaties to prevent any poſſibility of impoſition or deceit, we fight to little purpoſe, if thoſe advantages, which are gained in war, are to be of no conſideration at the ſettlement of

a Peace;

a Peace; and have no great reaſon to boaſt of our conqueſts, if the addreſs of our enemies is to ſtrip us of every benefit attending our ſucceſs.

An attention to articles ſo extremely material, Madam, is, however, the buſineſs of an adminiſtration, and that man muſt have either a weak head, or a corrupt heart, by whom they can poſſibly be neglected. We cannot forget, Madam, with what diſagreeable appearances the preſent war was commenced, and how extremely unpopular ſome perſons then in power rendered themſelves by the imbecility of their meaſures, and the tardineſs of their operations. We cannot forget the change of officers, in conſequence of the public uneaſineſs, or the execution of a commander, who was condemned for *not* doing his *utmoſt* in the ſervice of his country.

While

While theſe circumſtances are *remembered*, Madam, we *muſt* hope there will be no great occaſion for having them *mentioned*. An injudicious conduct in the management of a war, is not more culpable than the concluſion of a diſadvantageous Peace; and a miniſter, by the conſtitution of Great Britain, is no more above the cenſure of the laws than the meaneſt of the people.

A Peace, concluded upon diſadvantageous principles, has but a very little proſpect of duration, and fraught with whatever benefits it may appear, yet in reality it is no more than a ſkinning over the wound, without abating the virulence of the diſorder. We have now no more reaſon to depend upon the treaties of France than we had at the end of the laſt war, and I do not know why that maxim, which is ſo ſerviceable among individuals,

ſhould not be equally eſſential for the ſecurity of nations.

This maxim is nothing more than that the people, who have once deceived us, ſhould never have it in their power to be perfidious a ſecond time. Notorious for her breach of public faith, France laughs at the preſervation of treaties, when they lay any reſtraint upon her ambition, or appear repugnant to the attainment of that univerſal empire, for which ſhe has hitherto ſo unceaſingly contended. Whenever ſhe liſtens to terms of accommodation, we muſt ſuppoſe her ſtrength to be exhauſted, and that ſhe only begs a breathing time to recruit the ſpirit of her deſigns.

The preſent juncture is one of thoſe critical opportunities, wherein ſhe is reduced to a neceſſity of crying out for quarter, wherein ſhe muſt ſubmit

to

to whatever terms we think proper to ſtipulate, and unleſs we lay hold of ſo favourable a criſis, it is more than probable, we never will have (and, I am ſure, we never deſerve) another opportunity to humble her effectually, and to ſecure, not only our own tranquility, but the general Peace of all Europe. There is no dependance to be laid upon the moſt ſolemn obligations ſhe enters into, and we have, from a variety of inſtances, every reaſon to ſuppoſe, ſhe never will part with her intention to encroach upon the rights of her neighbours, till ſhe is totally diveſted of the power to attempt it. It is conſiderably better, that we ſhould have a ſuperiority over the French, than be liable to their inſults and incroachments; and no ſincere lover of his country, will, I dare ſay, be offended, if we are always in a capacity to check any attempts they might be inclined to make upon our proper-

ty.—A blow or two would entirely effect this ſalutary purpoſe, and the vigorous exertion of our force for a ſeaſon or two longer, prevent the expence of many millions, and ſave the lives of many thouſands for the future.

Plans of national œconomy are at ſuch a juncture the utmoſt prodigality, and we only ſave the expence of one year or two's taxes, to expoſe the nation to ſucceeding wars, and to entail endleſs difficulties upon our poſterity.—'Tis neglecting the viſible favour of that Providence which has bleſt us with an occaſion of ſecuring our own happineſs, to make no uſe of ſo favourable an opportunity; and let me aſk one queſtion, if we are at any time obliged to commence another war with France, what will be the conſequence, if we are attended with different ſucceſs? — Will ſhe have any regard to the *exceſſive* moderation we may have ſhewn her, or

treat

treat us with an equal ſhare of lenity? ——No; 'twould be ridiculous to ſuppoſe a circumſtance of that nature, and madneſs to expect it.

When I take the liberty of mentioning a diſadvantageous Peace to your Royal Highneſs, I would be underſtood to mean, that EVERY Peace is diſadvantageous that does not *effectually* provide for our future tranquility. I humbly apprehend, Madam, that ſuch a proviſion *is*, or at leaſt *ought* to be, the ultimate conſideration of every treaty; and allowing this to be the caſe, as in reality it is, from what has been already premiſed, the happineſs of Great Britain is not perfectly ſecured, while the French are leſt in *any* capacity to diſturb us.

Diſtreſs is the only medicine that can be preſcribed for the cure of pride, and nothing but ſeverity can poſſibly bring

bring the French to a proper knowledge of themſelves, or a real concern for thoſe calamities which their ambition had ſo frequently occaſioned in Europe.—The eaſineſs of an Engliſh miniſtry, not to give it a harſher appellation, has often given the French a ſufficient cauſe of exultation; and their ſtateſman have more than once poſitively declared, that whatever they had loſt during a war with Great Britain, they were ſure of gaining from her inattention at the concluſion of a Peace.——'Tis now high time we ſhould remove ſo ſarcaſtic, not to ſay contemptuous a reflection upon our underſtandings, and high time that France ſhould be made to feel the conſequence of her perfidy, and deprived of all ability to endanger that general repoſe, which ſhe has hitherto ſo greatly delighted to diſturb.

But if no terms of accommodation are proper for Great Britain to allow, but ſuch

ſuch as give her a conſiderable ſuperiority over France, how much to be dreaded are thoſe propoſitions, which viſibly leſſen that ſuperiority, and put the French upon rather more than an equality with ourſelves?—How much to be rejected are any terms, that put it again in the power of our enemies to cope with us, and poſſibly enable them to do ſomething more? — To what purpoſe have we conquered, if our conqueſt ſhould be reſtored? and to what purpoſe do we conclude a treaty of Peace, with a perfidious enemy, if we put it in the power of that enemy to break it at diſcretion?

Should the French ſettlements be reſtored, they will actually be the leaſt ſufferers by the preſent war.—Secured by favourable capitulations, the principal inhabitants of their colonies either retired to Old France with their treaſures, or continued in the poſſeſſion of their

their property unmoleſted and undiſturbed. It coſt us prodigious ſums of money and many thouſand brave lives, to make theſe acquiſitions; and the principal advantage they produced us was barely negative, in deſtroying the trade of our enemies.

We have yet reaped little or no commercial profits from the poſſeſſion of the French plantations, and the conſequence of returning them muſt only be, that in a ſhort time our enemies will recover themſelves from the loſſes they have ſuſtained, and the only reimburſement that we ſhall be able to obtain, will be the idle reputation of conquering ſo many valuable ſettlements, and the character of madneſs or ſtupidity in giving them up.

We have been too long ridiculouſly brave and prodigally generous.——We have been too long more attentive to the intereſt of other nations than mind-

ful

ful of the welfare of our own.—France is our moſt dangerous as well as our moſt implacable enemy.—She has long looked with an eye of envy upon the encreaſing opulence of this kingdom, and conſtantly endeavoured, by the moſt inſidious behaviour, to deſtroy it. To obtain her ſiniſter deſigns, what meaſures has ſhe ſtopped at? What ſteps has ſhe left untried? Have not the moſt ſolemn obligations been cancelled? Have not the moſt ſacred treaties been broken? Have not the bands of public faith, made before the face of all the world, and regiſtered in the ſight of God, been ſcandalouſly violated? What then are we to expect from ſuch a people? The anſwer to this queſtion is too obvious, and muſt fill every Engliſhman with the utmoſt concern and regreat.

Hitherto we have conſidered England, rather as a formidable power, than a commercial nation. We ſhall, therefore, make a few reflections upon

 our

our trade, and endeavour to point out how that may be affected upon a ſuppoſition, that the terms of the French were complied with at the enſuing negociation.

And here it is ſcarcely to be obſerved, that the opulence of Great Britain is principally the conſequence of her trade, or that her power almoſt wholly depends upon the intimacy of her connections with other nations. From the univerſality of her commerce, her greatneſs takes its riſe, and as that trade is affected it muſt follow, that the conſequence as a nation muſt be proportionably leſſened.

From a conviction of this truth, the French have conſtantly endeavoured to make every encroachment they poſſibly could upon our American ſettlements, and took all opportunities of excluding us from the general run of the European markets, and this they are much more

more eaſily enabled to effect from a ſimilitude of religion, a parity of manners; a vicinity, an actual neighbourhood of intercourſe and navigation abſtracted from a ſtill more material circumſtance, which is, that their commodities are much cheaper than ours, and rather more pleaſing to the eye of the purchaſer.

This laſt circumſtance of underſelling in foreign markets, we have in reality no title to be offended with, but it is our buſineſs by all means to prevent it, and this we now have entirely in our power from the poſſeſſion of thoſe colonies, from which they were ſupplied with the moſt neceſſary articles of their merchandize, and this we have an indiſputable claim to do, as well from the law of juſtice, as the law of nations, as well in vindication of our property, as in reſentment of our wrongs.

Theſe are motives in themſelves ſufficiently powerful to excite a vigorous oppoſition to every propoſal the French are inclinable to offer, and alone of conſequence enough to make us deaf to any treaty, but ſuch as from the cruſhing of their power may carry ſomething of a laſting appearance, and have a real tendency to the ſecurity of that welfare, which we have hitherto ſo ſtedfaſtly laboured to preſerve.

By the alliance with Spain, France is now to be conſidered, in point of commerce, as doubly dangerous to the trade of Great Britain. The Family Compact, entered into by theſe nations, is, in its nature, of the moſt prejudicial tendency to this kingdom, and calculated to reduce our ſtrength as a formidable power, and our intereſt as a trading people.

For

For if, by the poſſeſſion of the American iſlands, they are able to underſell us at foreign markets, we are deprived of the advantages ariſing from the very nature of colonies, and totally excluded from any traffic of conſequence with the continent, the intereſt of our enemies muſt be eſtabliſhed in Italy, Turkey, Portugal, Germany, Poland, and Ruſſia. In time, they will be able to engroſs all the commerce of the Levant; and ſhould the Family Compact ſtill continue, there is more than a bare probability that France and Spain may join in a naval force that would entirely prevent a paſſage to the Streights, in ſpite of our utmoſt efforts to effect it.

Happily hitherto the arm of that Being, who ſtill protects a juſt cauſe, has been remarkably diſtinguiſhed in our favour. The God of battles has taken part with the injured, and rendered

dered the machination of their enemies abortive.——But if we conclude any Peace with the French, that puts them again in poſſeſſion of their American plantations, that gives them the ſmalleſt ſettlement on the Newfoundland fiſhing coaſt, or reſtores their African and Eaſt-India colonies, they will be able to underſell us in our own very markets, from the prodigious extenſion of their trade, and in time we may look for no Engliſh veſſels upon the River THAME, but Newcaſtle colliers, and the lightermen of Rotherhithe.

Here it may be aſked, if it is in the power of Great Britain to keep all theſe ſettlements in her own poſſeſſion? To this a ſimple queſtion may very well ſerve for anſwer.——Is it NOW in the power of our enemies to take them from us?—No; but in time it will—How ſo?——Won't the addition of theſe colonies encreaſe the power of Great

Great Britain; and won't the loſs of them as viſibly leſſen the opulence of France?—What room can we poſſibly have for any apprehenſion of this nature, or what foundation can we have to ſuppoſe, that the poverty of our enemies, and the encreaſe of our own greatneſs, can ever be a ſource of new calamities, or plunge us in the difficulties of another war?

The home or domeſtic manufactures of France can never enable them to carry on a war with Great Britain; her opulence, like our own, principally ſprings from the foreign trade ſhe carries on from her colonies.—This foreign trade is an inexhauſtable ſource of wealth, and that wealth keeps her conſtantly reſtleſs and turbulent; but this channel of her greatneſs once ſtopped up, the effect muſt neceſſarily ceaſe with the cauſe, and ſhe can no more attempt to

invade

invade the poſſeſſions of Great Britain, when ſhe is totally deprived of the ability.

Some cold-blooded politicians may poſſibly remark in this place, that keeping ALL the poſſeſſions which we have taken from the French, is a circumſtance without a precedent.—For God's ſake let us make a precedent of it now. ——'Tis high time we ſhould begin—Had the laſt war been vigorouſly puſhed, we ſhould have had little occaſion for the commencement of the preſent one.——The truth of all the obſervations in the courſe of this epiſtle, has been ſufficiently proved by this very circumſtance.—The moment the French had it in their power to attack us, the moment they had recovered from the expences and loſs of the late war, they began to ſhew the natural turbulence and ambition of their temper!—Nay, even at the very time their agent was pro-

propoſing terms of accommodation to our court laſt winter, was not his maſter at the ſame moment carrying on an underhand connection with the king of Spain, and uſing every poſſible method to deſtroy our intereſt with one hand, while he carried propoſals for a general pacification in the other?

But the perfidy and unbounded ambition of the French nation are too univerſally known to be at all dwelt upon ——the only buſineſs of a Britiſh miniſtry is to avoid being made a dupe to the pretences of the firſt, or a tool to the threats of the latter; the grand principle for the ſyſtem of Engliſh politics is, to give France no quarter, till we have entirely deſtroyed the leaſt poſſibility of her reſentment; and this principle is of ſo great a conſequence, that it muſt frequently be urged, and plead its neceſſity for a frequency of the repetition.

Having thus taken a curſory view, Madam, of the fatal conſequences which may be apprehended to our trade, if we were to give up the conqueſts we have made in America, we muſt obſerve, that it is ſtill more dangerous for us to allow the French any ſettlement in our own iſlands, (if we may call thoſe iſlands our own of which they have diſpoſſeſſed us) in Newfoundland particularly, nothing can be more oppoſite to the intereſt of Great Britain, than to allow them the ſmalleſt footing; for if they are naturally fond of engroſſing thoſe places to themſelves, with which they have in fact little or no connexion, we can't but ſuppoſe they would make uſe of every means to encroach upon that part of our property, with which in reality they have.

Articles of limitation or agreements to employ but a ſtated number of veſſels, is

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at beſt but a precarious dependance, for their behaviour——We have already obſerved how little a regard they pay to the moſt ſolemn engagements, and we cannot expect any great inſtances of their juſtice or public faith in this reſpect, when we give them ſo fair an opportunity for the breach of both.

Our ſettlement at Newfoundland (I mean when it is recovered) is one of the moſt valuable of our American plantations, a continued mine of riches to the nation, and a perpetual nurſery of ſeamen for our defence; but to expatiate on the value of this iſland, is only to aggravate our concern for its loſs—Reverſes of fortune all nations have at ſometime experienced, and we have no reaſon to think ourſelves exempted from viciſſitudes of this nature, more than any other people.

One conſolation however remains to mitigate our concern for ſo valuable a part of the Britiſh dominions, and that is the little reaſon our enemies have to boaſt of their heroiſm in obtaining the poſſeſſion.——The victorious arms of Britain ſtill remain unconquered.——The French were afraid to face us where we had any force, and therefore pitifully ſtole an army of fifteen hundred men, where we had ſcarcely a body of fifty to oppoſe them—ſome people indeed may be fooliſh enough to ſuppoſe 'tis ſo much the worſe, ſince the enemy paid nothing for the conqueſt; but for my own part, I am comforted in the reflecting, that the loſs of Newfoundland was not the conſequence of the French bravery, but the mere effect of our own inattention.

Flattered, however, with an aſſurance that it would be ſpeedily reconquered,

quered, we ſhewed no great ſigns of diſſatisfaction at the loſs, but laid dependance enough upon that aſſurance to look out for the event that has not happened, nor indeed could it; but, I dare ſay, every lover of his country would be conſiderably better pleaſed with recovering the whole with the ſword, than a ſimple part by a lifeleſs negotiation.

It is not the intention of this epiſtle to enquire, to whoſe neglect we are to lay the loſs of Newfoundland, but if the loſs of that place ſhould be the means of precipitating us into a raſh Peace, or if that neglect ſhould be any wiſe detrimental to the terms of pacification we had a right to expect, a BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS will ſcarcely be ſilent on the occaſion, or ſit down without making ſome obſervations on ſo affecting a misfortune, and ſo national a diſgrace.

The

The principal argument, which is urged by the advocates for a hasty Peace, is the very great burthen we labour under in a national debt, and impossibility of removing it, if we continue the war. A Peace, upon any terms that are not visibly advantageous, is but a miserable expedient to lessen this national debt; for supposing our taxes were removed for two or three years, yet we may soon expect they will be renewed for fourteen or fifteen, if the French are left in any capacity to attack us. Another war must be quickly looked for, and possibly may not be attended with the success, which we have experienced in this; whereas a vigorous continuation of the present, will, in all probability, reduce our enemies to an utter incapability of offending us for the future.

But

But ſince we have ſpoke of the national debt, there ſeems to be a neceſſity for one enquiry, which is, to whom this national debt is owing? Upon the higheſt calculation, it does not exceed 140 millions. The ſum is undoubtedly prodigious; but, when it is recollected, that, at leaſt, three fourths of it is owing to ourſelves, our ſurprize and apprehenſion muſt be greatly leſſened, and the formidable bugbear of a national bankruptcy entirely removed. Do our parliamentary ſupplies wear either the appearance of poverty or diſtruſt? Not at all. The nation has undoubtedly been at great expence, but it is willing to go to conſiderably more, and prodigious as the ſums are, which have already been diſburſed, we yet have no inclination to withdraw our hands, while we are convinced, that a continuation of our liberality is applied

ed towards crushing the power of our enemies, and enhancing the greatness of our own.

Was there indeed a possibility to be totally divested of continental connexions, the forces of France could be only employed in *defensive* operations; for while we maintained our superiority at sea, there would be nothing left for them to attack.

It may, however, be observed, that could our troops be recalled from Germany, the force which France employs in that place against us would be entirely useless, and that the French must consequently turn that force against some of the British dominions!—But would not the very army which we keep there be as usefully employed in repulsing it? Would not the annual saving of so many millions, considerably add to our principal dependance, the strength of our navies; or if even the British troops only

ly in Germany were to be employed in our fleets, with our preſent ſuperiority, we ſhould have it in our power to baffle the utmoſt exertion of all the French maritime oppoſition, ſhould they even reinforce it with their power in that quarter, and be ſupplied with the confederate aſſiſtance of their allies.

But the propriety and impropriety, the uſe and inconvenience of continental connexions being long ago elaborately diſcuſſed, there is no great occaſion of dwelling upon that ſubject in this place, tho' one obſervation muſt appear pretty obvious, and that is the impolitic conduct of both Great Britain and France in the proſecution of a German war, when neither can poſſibly be a gainer by the event, in maintaining a large army, and diſburſing large ſums without any proſpect of the moſt diſtant benefit, but the moſt abſolute certainty of a conſiderable loſs.

Indeed, if there is any excuſe for the conduct of either in this reſpect, we have it intirely on our ſide. A regard for the proteſtant religion, and a laudable view of preſerving the ballance of power in Europe, were ſome grounds for our taking part with a prince, with whom in reality we could have but little political concern.

I am well aware, that when I ſay we could have but little political connexion with the continent, that ſome ſage ſnuff-taking coffee-houſe politician, with a conſequential gravity, and ſignificant diſtention of noſtril, will be apt to exclaim.——What! is it not the buſineſs of Great Britain to preſerve the ballance of power in Europe?—What ballance of power, my dear Sir?—Are not Pruſſia, Poland, Sweeden, Denmark, Ruſſia, Holland, Portugal, Switzerland, Sardinia, Venice, Genoa, Naples, and the

the Papacy, able to preſerve a ballance againſt the houſes of Bourbon and Auſtria—without our troubling ourſelves with the matter?—We can't be affected, as I ſee, by any continental altercations, if we ſuppoſe every nation to have the leaſt regard for it's own welfare——and if other ſtates are remiſs in their own concerns, muſt we perpetually be waſting our treaſures, and ſpending our blood to ſet them right?

To preſerve the ballance of power in Europe is a phraſe that carries a great deal of pomp, and has pretty effect enough upon the ear; but when it is conſidered how little we have to do with other peoples buſineſs, I fancy any ſenſible man would be every whit as well pleaſed if we paid a greater attention to our own.

I would not from this be underſtood to mean, that the treaty with his Pruſ-

ſian majeſty ſhould not be inviolably preſerved.——On the contrary; I look upon civil ſecurity to be totally at an end, if there is any breach made in public faith.——Were we to break our treaty with his Pruſſian Majeſty, with what face of reaſon could we blame the perfidy of France, or how could we juſtify ourſelves for taking up arms to revenge a behaviour, which our own practice had ſo evidently approved?

But tho' I ſet ſo high a regard upon the purity of public faith, yet it were well, if in our next alliance we were actuated by a ſpirit of more prudence and leſs generoſity; it were well if we concerned ourſelves in no matters, but what immediately affected our honour and intereſt, and that we left the continental powers to decide their own differences among themſelves.

But

But to return: Among the many inſtances which we might have given of the French, I ſhould have ſaid, of the Bourbon ambition and perfidy, the unjuſtifiable attack upon the dominions of his moſt faithful majeſty ſhould not be forgotten; in public oppoſition to reaſon and juſtice, in open violation to the laws of nations to make war upon a peaceable prince, to invade his dominions, and diſtreſs his people, when they were but juſt recovering from a ſeries of general calamity, juſt beginning to riſe from the ruins of their country, and juſt taſting the returning mercy of that Providence which had thought proper to afflict them; at ſuch time, without any colourable pretence, without any appearance of reaſon, inſtead of affording that aſſiſtance to their misfortunes, which was due from the principles of common humanity, or which might be expected from the

ties

ties of blood. At ſuch a time to attack them, and upon ſuch motives, is a circumſtance equally cruel as unjuſt, and ſuch as muſt brand the names of the invaders, I might have ſaid with juſtice, the royal ruffians the ſceptered robbers, with everlaſting infamy and diſgrace.

Fraught with a tender concern for their own welfare, and ſtimulated by a laudable deſire of ſcourging theſe illuſtrious ſpoilers, the people of Great Britain would ſenſibly regret any concluſion of a Peace, that gave her inveterate enemy the leaſt probability of ever renewing her ambitious operations. From ſuch a diſpoſition the enemies of the preſent m——y have taken an opportunity of inflaming the minds of the people, and of reflecting upon the character of a certain noble perſonage, who preſides at one of the firſt boards in the kingdom. They have insolently

ly ſuppoſed, that by his concurrence and advice that all our valuable conqueſts were to be reſtored the French, to be allowed a ſettlement upon our iſlands, and our allies to be deſerted. They have dared to depreciate his underſtanding, and to vilify his character, and preſumed, in a moſt ſcandalous manner, to publiſh a variety of pieces highly diſgraceful to the place of his birth, and tending to leſſen that mutual confidence, which is the ſecurity of the two nations. What have they not dared to inſinuate, without regard to birth, without conſideration of rank, without reſpect to juſtice. But calumny and reproach are frequently the reward of extraordinary merit and virtue, and the more exalted the ſtation, the more apt envious minds are to cenſure and condemn. In the language of my motto:

'Tis a buſy talking world, and with licentious breath
Blows as freely on the palace as on the cottage.

No rank, or ſituation, can exempt us from the popular odium, and it is ſometimes a debt, which great minds are obliged to pay for any extraordinary refinement in their ſentiments.

The privilege of an Engliſhman in ſpeaking his mind upon public occaſions, is undoubtedly a very great benefit in our conſtitution, yet I have lately ſeen it carried to lengths ſo extremely illiberal, as to wiſh for ſome little reſtriction in the manner. Writers may reaſon without ſcurrility, and argue without ill manners, and it is ſomething very hard, that a peer of the realm, and a counſellor to the king, is perpetually expoſed to the wantonneſs

and

and malevolence of every little ſcribler, who chooſes to deliver his opinion upon the affairs of the kingdom, and who pleads the privilege of a free-born Engliſhman for his licentiouſneſs and abuſe; there ſhould be ſome difference made between the privilege of the preſs and the inſolence; and ſome diſtinction between the wantonneſs of freedom, and the indulgence of liberty.

Unleſs ſome regulation of this nature is eſtabliſhed, no characters can be ſafe. Some inſignificant monthly or critical reviewer, ſome occaſional underſtrapper in periodical dulneſs and invective may, at all times, when the bookſeller ſtrikes out a fortunate title, write a whole nation into broils, and yet preſerve ſo hapy an ambiguity of phraſeology, and ſo ſeaſonably interlard his performance with aſteriſms and daſhes, as to bid an open defiance to all ſenſe of ſhame, expreſs an abſolute contempt for the laws, and think with

the cooleſt unconcern upon the reſentment of juſtice, and the ſcandal of the pillory.

Amiable as the nobleman I ſpeak of is in private life, and deſervedly admired, as he muſt be, in public, yet how ſcandalouſly has he been treated by ſome illiberal pretenders to decency and underſtanding, his affection to his Sovereign has been called a cloak to his ambition, and the effects of his prudence the reſult of his parſimony. Motives have been aſſigned for his conduct, which he never thought of, and reaſons for his actions of which he never dreamt. He has been talked of as wholly diveſted of principle and underſtanding, as betraying the intereſt of his P——e, and ſacrificing the welfare of his country.

Heavy accuſation! And what is the foundation of all theſe complaints?—Why nothing more or leſs, than his lordſhip's

lordſhip's being unfortunately born the other ſide the Tweed, and honoured with a royal confidence, which he has been found to deſerve.

Other people generally form their notions from the appearance of circumſtances, but the good people of Great Britain are too ſenſible to wait for any appearances at all. Naturally inclined to be out of humour, they look upon every perſon, as a friend to his country, that talks about its ruin, or conſults the unaccountable acidity of their humour.

Hence fretted by what ſome intereſted ſcriblers have told them about the impropriety of a Scotchman's being in power; they are dubious of his abilities and integrity, and embrace every opportunity, with an eagerneſs of ſatisfaction, that is in the leaſt calculated to prejudice his reputation.

Conſcious of this aptitude to be diſpleaſed, the ſame ſet of public-ſpirited gentry have alarmed us with a fear, that the terms of the enſuing negotiation will be highly diſadvantageous, and that we are going to make ſome conceſſions to the court of Verſailles, which are both diſhonourably prejudicial and deſtructively abſurd.

Theſe political writers have been content to form imaginary terms, and never troubled themſelves with a conſideration, whether they were guided by reaſon, or founded upon probability.——Stimulated by their prejudice, they were regardleſs how much they erred; and, in the height of their animoſity to Lord B—, have given us ſome articles, to which the moſt credulous of his enemies can ſcarcely give any credit or belief——They have been weak enough to

ſay,

ſay, our conqueſts were all to be returned; and, in ſhort, that after a chain of the moſt glorious ſucceſſes that ever diſtinguiſhed any war, we were going to conclude a Peace upon terms the moſt ridiculous and abſurd.

We have endeavoured to ſhew, during the courſe of this epiſtle, what meaſures are proper to be purſued with regard to a treaty of pacification; and theſe we have not laid down from a preſumptuous ſuppoſition that they had not been properly conſidered by the M——y, but principally to ſatisfy the enquiries of the people, what ſteps ſhould be taken in ſo important an affair, and by that information remove their uneaſineſs, ſince they muſt hope that from the common prudence of any M——y they would be ſtedfaſtly purſued.

We

We are now to pay no compliment to a people, who never ſhewed any eſteem for us.—French politeneſs ſhould never get the aſcendancy of Britiſh underſtanding.——Nor ſhould we purchaſe an encomium from any nation, at ſo dear a price as our ſecurity and welfare.

Let us conſider, if the French are inclinable to a Peace, 'tis for their own ſakes, and as they conſult no intereſt but their own, I ſee no reaſon why they ſhould exceed us in prudence and diſcretion, eſpecially as we are in a capacity to make the terms perfectly agreeable to ourſelves.

Let not a falſe notion, that we ſhall be always invincible, and have it in our power to chaſtiſe the perfidy of our enemies, render us inattentive to our intereſt.

tereſt.——'Tis more adviſeable to preſerve a ſuperiority, than to contend for one. The ineffectuality of former treaties ſhould convince us of ſo neceſſary a truth, and put us wiſely on our guard in the preſent one.—In ſhort, our M—y ſhould take notice of theſe two lines in an old ballad, if they would prove a juſt concern for the welfare of the kingdom and their own:

Learn to be wiſe by other's harms,
And you ſhall do full well.

Where the intereſt of people are ſo immediately concerned, 'tis but natural to expect they *will* talk; and ſhould any unſuſpecting uneaſineſs on our ſide of the queſtion give way to the political plauſibilities of a French negotiation, 'tis impoſſible to ſay where the conſequence will ſtop.—For if, upon the bare ſuppoſition that the terms are to be favourable to France, ſome intereſted writers ridicule the abilities of the

M——y,

M——y, and *have a ſhameful tale to tell* of an apprehended Peace; if *the talkers of this populous city* have now the addreſs to work upon our fears, and render us publickly unhappy, by the bare idea of a diſadvantageous accommodation, how much more would they have it in their power to inflame the nation, ſhould there be any foundation for their argument?

Public harmony is the baſis of public ſecurity, and the wheels of government muſt be materially retarded, if the leaſt fracture ſhould happen to the great axis upon which they turn, the affection of the people.——The ſatiſfaction of the kingdom is the higheſt eulogium that can be made on any adminiſtration—and no one can ever diſpute the wiſdom or integrity of a miniſter, while the people are contented.

From

From our amazing ſucceſs in the proſecution of the war, we are naturally led to look for a *moſt* advantageous and honourable Peace; with this agreeable idea we have long flattered our imagination, and the more we delighted ourſelves with ſuch an expectation, the more we muſt be affected, ſhould we unhappily be diſappointed in our hopes.

I have little more to add in this Epiſtle to your Royal Highneſs, but a repetition of my former excuſe for any ſeeming impropriety in the freedom of ſuch an addreſs. For my own part, I am entirely ſatisfied about the enſuing Peace; and perfectly convinced, that members of the adminiſtration will omit no opportunity of promoting the welfare of their King, and the intereſt of their Country.

Senſible that perſons of diſtinguiſhed rank and abilities, who are acquainted with the moſt ſecret ſprings of our own government, and clearly verſed in the political conſtitution of other nations, muſt be as good judges of the true happineſs of Great Britain, as our modern dabblers in public affairs. I readily ſubmit the means of proſecuting their happineſs to their ſuperior wiſdom, and muſt honeſtly confeſs, I never ſuſpect any perſon's integrity, till poſitive facts give me tolerable reaſon.

I have no notion, that becauſe a perſon may be a nobleman, he muſt not be honeſt; or that being born a hundred miles from the place of my own nativity, can occaſion a depravity of manners, or a corruptneſs of heart. Worth is not confined to kingdoms, or excellence to countries.

Some

" *Some native ſpark of heavenly fire confeſt,*
" *Glows to divine, within the Indians breaſt;*
" *Swells unconfin'd from* Britain *to the pole,*
" *Expands the genius, and exalts the ſoul!*
" *While every clime by ſubtlety's trepannings,*
" *Has Bottle Conjurers, and Betſey Cannings!*
" *Peculiar follies mark'd on every coaſt,*
" *A human rabbit, or a Cock-Lane ghoſt.*

Praying with the deepeſt fervency for the happineſs of your Royal Highneſs, and all your illuſtrious family, I beg leave to ſubſcribe myſelf, with the moſt reſpectful veneration,

MADAM,

Your devoted and obedient

humble Servant,

AN ENGLISHMAN.

FINIS.